Mechanism design with limited commitment
WebJul 28, 2024 · Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for the designer-optimal outcome by reducing the agent's behavior to a series of participation, truth telling, and Bayes' plausibility constraints the mechanisms must satisfy. WebJul 1, 2024 · Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment Econometrica CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Authors: Laura Doval Vasiliki Skreta University College London Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle...
Mechanism design with limited commitment
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WebEconometrica - 2024 - Doval - Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment.pdf - Published Version Download (397kB) Preview Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. WebTherefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for …
WebAug 25, 2024 · Limited Commitment: Mechanism Design Meets Information Design Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism … WebJun 2, 2024 · We study mechanism design with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a "spot" contract to a privately informed agent without committing to future contracts. In contrast to the classical model with a fixed information structure, we allow for all admissible information structures. We represent the information structure as a ...
WebDec 3, 2024 · Abstract We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich … WebWe develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent.
WebMechanism Design With Limited Commitment. Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta. Econometrica, 2024, vol. 90, issue 4, 1463-1500 . Abstract: We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism‐selection games in which the designer can only commit to short‐term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich …
WebMechanism Design With Limited Commitment Author & abstract Download 17 References Most related Related works & more Corrections Author Listed: Laura Doval Vasiliki Skreta … harbor freight tools mower liftWebAug 25, 2024 · A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomesan explicit part of the … chandigarh to hyderabad flight bookingWebdynamic mechanism design problems. Since we insist on full commitment power throughout this survey, we bypass the vast literature on Coasian bargaining that has the lack of commitment at its heart. Similarly, we do not consider contract dynamics resulting from renegotiation. Since both the seller and the buyer commit to the mechanism, we also harbor freight tools - natickWebJul 1, 2024 · A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. chandigarh to hoshiarpur distanceWebRevelation principlefor mechanism design with limited commitment. We study a game between an uninformed designer and an informed agent with persistent private … harbor freight tools new iberia laWebAuctions with Limited Commitment by Qingmin Liu, Konrad Mierendorff, Xianwen Shi and Weijie Zhong. Published in volume 109, issue 3, pages 876-910 of American Economic … chandigarh to haridwar trainA major challenge in the received literature on limited commitment is how to keep track of how the agent's best response to the mechanism affects the information that the designer obtains from the interaction, which in turn affects the designer's incentives to offer the mechanism in the first place. harbor freight tools new bern nc